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kashmir myths: india refuses a plebiscite – 1

Posted by littleindian on September 19, 2007. |

Continuing from: kashmir-myths: pakistan’s claims on kashmir

 

KASHMIR, a princely state, was never a subject of the Mountbatten Plan.
Yet the name PAKISTAN was based on the first letters of the regions demanded.
Since 1933

It has ALWAYS BEEN a matter of what Pakistan wants.
for them it has NEVER BEEN what the People of Kashmir wants.

And since January 5, 1949,
it is clearly documented, Pakistan has excluded a “free Kashmir” as an option.

 

PAKISTAN DECLARATION 1933:
NOW OR NEVER: ARE WE TO LIVE OR PERISH FOR EVER?

Rahmat Ali’s Pakistan Declaration issued on January 28, 1933 from Cambridge.

At this solemn hour in the history of India, when British and Indian statesmen are laying the foundations of a Federal Constitution for that land, we address this appeal to you, in the name of our common heritage, on behalf of our thirty million Muslim brethren who live in PAKSTAN – by which we mean the five Northern units of India, Viz: Punjab, North-West Frontier Province (Afghan Province), Kashmir, Sind and Baluchistan – for your sympathy and support in our grim and fateful struggle against political crucifixion and complete annihilation.

 

October 26, 1947
LETTER FROM HARI SINGH TO MOUNTBATTEN

Excerpts from the letter: written on the day of Pakistani invasion of Jammu & Kashmir

My dear Lord Mountbatten,
I have to inform Your Excellency that a grave emergency has arisen in my State and request the immediate assistance of your Government…

Afridis, soldiers in plain clothes, and desperadoes wnh modern weapons have been allowed to infiltrate into the State, at first in the Poonch area, then from Sia1kot and finally in a mass in the area adjoining-Hazara district on the Ramkote side…

The wild forces thus let loose on the State are marching on with the aim of capturing Srinagar, the summer capital of my government, as a first step to overrunning the whole State.

War in Kashmir 1947
An unnecessary war was sent into Kashmir in 1947

 

October 26, 1947
INSTRUMENT OF ACCESSION

Excerpts from the document:

Whereas the Indian Independence Act, 1947, provides that as from the fifteenth day of August, 1947, there shall be set up an independent Dominion known as INDIA, and that the Government of India Act 1935, shall with such…

Now, therefore, I Shriman Inder Mahinder Rajrajeswar Maharajadhiraj Shri Hari Singhji, Jammu & Kashmir Naresh Tatha Tibbet adi Deshadhipati, Ruler of Jammu & Kashmir State, in the exercise of my Sovereignty in and over my said State do hereby execute this my Instrument of Accession and

1. I hereby declare that I accede to the Dominion of India with the intent that the Governor General of India, the Dominion Legislature, the Federal Court and any other Dominion authority established for the purposes…

 

October 26, 1947
TELEGRAM FROM NEHRU TO BRITISH PM CLEMENT ATTLEE

Excerpts from the telegram:

“I should like to make it clear that question of aiding Kashmir in this emergency is not designed in any way to influence the State to accede to India. Our view which we have repeatedly made public is that the question of accession in any disputed territory or State must be decided in accordance with wishes of people and we adhere to this view. It is quite clear, however, that no free expression of will of people of Kashmir is possible if external aggression succeeds in imperilling integrity of its territory.

I have thought it desirable to inform you of situation because of its threat of international complications.”

 

October 27, 1947
CONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE OF ACCESSION:

“My dear Maharaja Sahib,
Your Highness’ letter dated 26 October has been delivered to me by Mr. V. P. Menon. In the special circumstances mentioned by your Highness my Government have decided to accept the accession of Kashmir State to the Dominion of India…”.

Yours sincerely, October 27, 1947. Mountbatten of Burma.”

 

October 27, 1947
TELEGRAM FROM NEHRU TO PAKISTAN PM LIAQAT ALI KHAN

The day the Indian army officially intervened in Kashmir: excerpts from the telegram:

I should like to make it clear that the question of aiding Kashmir in this emergency is not designed in any way to influence the State to accede to India. Our view which we have repeatedly made public is that the question of accession in any disputed territory or State must be decided in accordance with the wishes of people and we adhere to this view.

 

October 31, 1947
TELEGRAM FROM NEHRU TO PAKISTAN PM LIAQAT ALI KHAN

Sent four days later, excerpts from the telegram:

” …. our assurance that we shall withdraw our troops from Kashmir as soon as peace and order are restored and leave the decision about the future of the State to the people of the State is not merely a pledge to your government but also to the people of Kashmir and to the world.”

 

November 1, 1947
A DISCUSSION BETWEEN Mr. Jinnah and Governor General Mountbatten
IN THE PRESENCE of Lord Ismay at GOVERNMENT HOUSE, LAHORE

Excerpts from Governor General Mountbatten’s own notes

Part I: India’s Policy towards States whose Accession Was in Dispute:
I pointed out the similarity between the cases of Junagadh and Kashmir and suggested that plebiscites should be held under UNO as soon as conditions permitted. I told Mr. Jinnah that I had drafted out in the aeroplane a formula which I had not yet shown to my Government but to which I thought they might agree.

This was the formula:’
“The Governments of India and Pakistan agree that, where the ruler of a State does not belong to the community to which the majority of his subjects belong, and where the State has not acceded to that Dominion whose majority community is the same as the State’s, the question of whether the State should finally accede to one or the other of the Dominions should in all cases be decided by an impartial reference to the will of the people.”

Mr. Jinnah’s first observation was that it was redundant and undesirable to have a plebiscite when it was quite clear that States should go according to their majority population, and if we would give him the accession of Kashmir he would offer to urge the accession of Junagadh direct to India.

I told him that my Government would never agree to changing the accession of a State against the wishes of the ruler or the Government that made the accession unless a plebiscite showed that the particular accession was not favoured by the people.

Mr. Jinnah then went on to say that he could not accept a formula if it was so drafted as to include Hyderabad, since he pointed out that Hyderabad did not wish to accede to either Dominion and he could not be a party to coercing them to accession. I offered to put in some reference to. States whose accession was in dispute “to try and get round the Hyderabad difficulty” and he said that he would give that his careful consideration if it was put to him.

I then pointed out that he really could not expect a principle to be applied in the case of Kashmir if it was not applied in the case of Junagadh and Hyderabad, but that we naturally would not expect him to be a party to compulsory accession against the wishes of the Nizam.

I asked Mr. Jinnah why he objected so strongly to a plebiscite, and he said he did so because with the troops of the Indian Dominion in military occupation of Kashmir and with the National Conference under Sheikh Abdullah in power, such propaganda and pressure could be brought to bear that the average Muslim would never have the courage to vote for Pakistan.

I suggested that we might invite UNO to undertake the plebiscite and send observers and organisers in advance to ensure that the necessary atmosphere was created for a free and impartial plebiscite. I reiterated that the last thing my Government wished was to obtain a false result by a fraudulent plebiscite.

Part II. Kashmir:
I handed Mr. Jinnah a copy of the statement of events signed by the Indian Chiefs of Staff, which I had shown to Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan.

Continuing he said that the accession was not a bona fide one since it rested on “fraud and violence” and would never be accepted by Pakistan.

I asked him to explain why he used the term “fraud,” since the Maharaja was fully entitled, in accordance with Pakistan’s own official statement, which I had just read over to him, to make such accession: It was therefore perfectly legal and valid.

Mr. Jinnah said that this accession was the end of a long intrigue and that it had been brought about by violence. I countered this by saying that I entirely agreed that the accession had been brought about by violence; I knew the Maharaja was most anxious to remain independent, and nothing but the terror of violence could have made him accede to either Dominion; since the violence had come from tribes for whom Pakistan was responsible, it was clear that he would have to accede to India to obtain help against the invader.

Mr. Jinnah repeatedly made it clear that in his opinion it was India who had committed this violence by sending her troops into Srinagar; I countered as often with the above argument, thereby greatly enraging Mr. Jinnah at my apparent denseness.

Lord Ismay suggested that the main thing was to stop the fighting; and he asked Mr. Jinnah how he proposed that this should be done. Mr. Jinnah said that both sides should withdraw at once. He emphasised that the withdrawal must be simultaneous.

When I asked him how the tribesmen were to be called off, he said that all he had to do was to give them an order to come out and to warn them that if they did not comply, he would send large forces along their lines of communication. In fact, if I was prepared to fly to Srinagar with him, he would guarantee that the business would be settled within 24 hours. I expressed mild astonishment at the degree of control that he appeared to exercise over the raiders.

I asked him how he proposed that we should withdraw our forces, observing that India’s forces were on the outskirts of Srinagar in a defensive role; all the tribes had to do was to stop attacking.

 

November 2, 1947
Extracts from Nehru’s Broadcast

“We have decided to accept this accession and to send troops by air, but we made a ‘condition that the accession would have to be considered by the people of Kashmir later when peace and order were established. We were anxious not to finalise anything in a moment of crisis, and without the fullest opportunity to the people of Kashmir to have their say. It was for them ultimately to decide.

“And here let me make clear that it has been our policy all along that where there is a dispute about the accession of a State to either Dominion, the decision must be made by the people of the State. It was in accordance with this policy that we added a proviso to the Instrument of Accession of Kashmir.

“We have declared that the fate of Kashmir is ultimately to be decided by the people. That pledge we have given, and the Maharaja has supported it not only to the people of Kashmir but the world. We will not, and cannot back out of it. We are prepared when peace and law and order have been established to have a referendum held under international auspices like the United Nations. We want it to be a fair and just reference to the people, and we shall accept their verdict. I can imagine no fairer and juster offer.”

 

November 3, 1947
TELEGRAM FROM NEHRU TO PAKISTAN PM LIAQAT ALI KHAN

Nehru’s reiteration of plebiscite pledge: excerts from the telegram:

“I wish to draw your attention to broadcast on Kashmir which l made last evening. have stated our Government’s policy and made it clear that we have no desire to impose our will on Kashmir but to leave final decision to people of Kashmir. l further stated that we have agreed on impartial international agency like United Nation’, supervising any referendum.”

 

November 25, 1947
Mr Nehru’s address to the Constituent Assembly of India, stated:

“Further we made it clear that as soon as law and order had been restored in Kashmir and her soil cleared of the invaders, the question of the State’s accession should be settled by reference to the people.”
He added: “In order to establish our bonafides we have suggested that when the people are given the chance to decide their future this should be done under the supervision of an impartial tribunal such as the United Nations Organisation.

 

Historical, Moral and Constitutional Perspectives – contd:

Professor Pranawa C. Deshmukh

On Jan. 1, 1948, India, an infant country facing armed aggression, complained to the UN Security Council under the provision of Article 35 of the UN Charter.

The UN, regarded as the guardian of world order was itself a fledgling organization, and took eight months to have the United Nations Commission on India and Pakistan (UNCIP) resolution tabled on August 13, 1948.

The issue before UN under Article 35 was Pakistan’s aggression against India, and not the legality of the Instrument of Accession.
The latter has never been questioned by anybody, including UN legal experts, yet the world is made to believe that it is the accession that is under dispute!

 

January 1, 1948
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA’S LETTER TO THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL

Excerpts from the letter:

“6. The grave threat to the life and property of innocent people in the Kashmir Valley and to the security of the State of Jammu and Kashmir that had developed as a result of the invasion of the Valley demanded immediate decision by the Government of India on both the requests. It was imperative on account of the emergency that the responsibility for the defence of Jammu and Kashmir State should be taken over by a Government capable of discharging it.
But, in order to avoid any possible suggestion that India had utilised the State’s immediate peril for her own political advantage, the Government of India made it clear that once the soil of the State had been cleared of the invader and normal conditions restored, its people would be free to decide their future by the recognized democratic methods of a plebiscite or referendum which, in order to ensure complete impartiality, might be held under international auspices.

“7. The Government of Indian felt it their duty to respond to the appeal for armed assistance because:

“(1) They could not allow a neighbouring and friendly State to be compelled by force to determine either its internal affairs or its external relations;
“(2) The accession of Jammu and Kashmir State to the Dominion of India made India really responsible for the defence of the State.

 

 

continued as kashmir myths: india refuses a plebiscite – 2

 

Posted by littleindian on . |


5 Responses to “kashmir myths: india refuses a plebiscite – 1”


  1. Thanks Durham Shukla. I just posted it.

  2. [...] kashmir myths: india refuses a plebiscite - 2 continuing from kashmir myths: india refuses a plebiscite – 1 [...]

  3. the only possible solution is pok with pakistan and jammu and kashmir in india with more autonomy..

  4. @sunny .. more autonomy ??? u seriously dn have a clue about the real issue do you ???

  5. [...] continuing from kashmir myths: india refuses a plebiscite – 1 [...]