"me no big chief …

The present Government of India is keen to sign an (123) Agreement
with the United States, for cooperation concerning uses of nuclear energy.

The United States own Federal law, the Section 123 of Atomic Energies Act 1954
prohibits the US government from signing a deal with a non – NNP signatory state.

The US Government, under George W Bush passed the Henry Hyde’s Act to exempt
the government from the mandatory requirements of the Atomic Energy Act 1954.

The original text of the deal, which has only recently (3 August) been disclosed
and the strict terms of the Henry Hyde’s Act has caused concerns
not only amongst politicians but also outside the Parliament,
notably amongst the nuclear scientists.

The much abused “Left” has raised the strongest objection.
The many voices that are raised in favour of this controversial deal.
wants to divert attention from what the “left” are saying about the deal,
to the “Left’s” ideology, or what decisions or steps they have taken in the past.
This is a deliberate attempt to divert focus from the concerns of the text of this deal.
I have not heard any of these voices discuss the history of America’s foreign policies.

They also try to imply that the “left front” only represents the state of West Bengal.
To be clear, the left front holds power in West Bengal and Kerela; they also have
support in Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Punjab and Tamil Nadu and Tripura.

This is how the “Left” have expressed their worries ,

This agreement covers political, economic, military, and nuclear cooperation. This alliance entails not just nuclear cooperation but talks of the two countries promoting global democracy, revamping the Indian economy to facilitate large scale investment by the United States, and a strategic military collaboration.

The Left parties have, after carefully assessing the implications of the 123 agreement, demanded that the government should not proceed further to operationalise the agreement. The objections to the deal have been spelt out in detail in the statement issued by the Left parties. The Left is clear that going ahead with the agreement will bind India to the United States in a manner that will seriously impair an independent foreign policy and our strategic autonomy.

Instead what they have asked is

The best course would be for the government not to proceed further with the operationalising of the agreement. Till all the doubts are clarified and the implications of the Hyde Act evaluated, the government should not take the next steps with regard to negotiating the IAEA safeguards, which are to be in perpetuity, and proceed to get the guidelines from the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

This is a fair and reasonable request.
As Dr Subroto Roy has written,

What the Manmohan-Montek Planning Commission needed to do first of all was a thorough cost-benefit analysis of India’s energy requirements but such elementary professionalism has been sorely lacking among our economists for decades.

The answer to our present conundrum must be patience and the fullest transparency. What is the rush?

If it is good or bad for us to buy six or eight new American reactors now, it will remain good or bad to do so a year or two from now after everyone has had a thorough think about everything that is involved.

Only those with any vested interest will be rushing to seal the deal.

And please don’t anyone say computer simulations have replaced nuclear testing.
They are just simulations of ‘abstract’ model of any particular system being tested.
Nothing more. And are only as good as the computer program written for it.
If ever required in future, every nuclear weapon state will have to and will
conduct underground tests to verify and validate important parameters.

I believe this deal if it goes through,
it will have adverse effects only on Indians living in India.
Not the Indians living permanently abroad or has foreign nationality.

For when things go wrong, they have the option to shrug their shoulders
and walk away unlike the people living in India who will be
entrapped in America’s strategic designs in South Asia.

In future, before these voices are raised in favour of the deal,
they should declare

where they reside,
what nationality they hold
if they have any plans to return to live in India
if they aspire to obtain unlimited resident status or the coveted green card.

I am an Indian living in UK for 18 years,
but I have not changed my Indian nationality for a foreign passport.
I have every intention to return back to India when my job here is done.

I do not want to return to a country entangled in US’s designs in South Asia.
I do not care who asks these questions, be they the Left, the Right or the Center,
I want the deal to be put on hold, while those who understands can study the deal.

I will say, if you are arguing for the signing of this deal
but now are an American national or an Indian hoping for a green card,
you may not have the best interests of the common Indian at heart,
this is not your concern, not your problem, not your debate,
so just stay out of it.

AmericaIndiaHyde’s Act123 Agreementfearmongering

An update: 08.09.2007
If you have linked here from mutiny.in
to read my views on 123 Agreement, to get my full perspective
you may need to read a few more, if you have the patience…
@ http://wordpress.com/tag/123-agreement/
…and I have not finished with it yet.

when apparently intelligent and educated communities
makes us believe they are experts on
matters as wide ranging as

Nuclear energy and weapons technology
International Nuclear Non-proliferation policy
United States Federal Law- Atomic Energy Act of 1954
United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006’’.
Every point discussed between the two countries in the last two years.
(123) Agreement for cooperation…concerning peaceful use of Nuclear Energy
America’s foreign policy in the middle east, Iraq war and now war with Iran
America’s dollar hegemony and Iran’s threat to petrodollar

and more qualified than the nuclear scientists and political analysts
in declaring to the nation that there is NOTHING TO FEAR in this Indo-US deal,

India is in deep deep trouble.

India’s “Left” had raised concerns regarding the discrepancies
between the discussions and the final version of the Hyde’s Act and
the lack of clarity or explanation in the final document of the agreement.

These intelligent people, as their main argument in response to the “Left’s” concerns,
convincingly says

How can a requirement between the US President and the US Congress be a part of an international deal between US and India?! The 123 agreement is between the US and India. It does not, and cannot, contain any clauses regarding what the US President needs to do for the US Congress. The 123 agreement has no such requirements.

They publish links to the 123 Agreement, but strangely not to the Hyde’s Act,

Even though the full title of the act states:
‘‘Henry J. Hyde United States- India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006’’
In my reckoning, the Act defines US’s expectations of India’s future “coopoeration”.

Click HERE to read the Hyde’s Act in full

They can also say

It is clear from these nine objections of the CPI(M), that either they’re misinformed about the 123 agreement (a fault of the Congress government) or they’re immune to the sensitivities involved in negotiating an international agreement.
Their scholarly stand of nitpicking over clauses of the 123 agreement, picking words and phrases out of context, and misrepresenting them towards irrational conclusions is just a political gimmick.

Should we then, accept that Hyde’s Law is irrelevant in this Indo-US nuclear agreement?

I can only presume the writers are experts in all matters of international agreements.
I make no such claims, so I will rely on documented statements and opinions
of those who I consider are the real experts and/or directly involved.

Let us look at what someone from US State department has to say.

Burns on Bringing India in from the Cold, and Isolating Iran

The Capital Interview: August 2, 2007

Interviewee: R. Nicholas Burns, Under Secretary of State, U.S. Department of State
Interviewer: Robert McMahon, Deputy Editor

Does the deal address U.S. concerns that India would support efforts to press Iran to abandon its suspected nuclear weapons program?

This is a technical agreement of the type that we’ve done with Japan, Russia, China, and the European Union in the past, so it doesn’t speak to political issues in the text of the agreement.

But apart from that, we have been very actively involved in counseling the Indian government that they should remain with the rest of the international community in arguing to the Iranians that they should not become a nuclear weapons power, number one.

And number two, we hope very much that India will not conclude any long-term oil and gas agreements with Iran.

The Indians, as you know, have voted with us at the International Atomic Energy Agency board of governors against Iran on two occasions.

And so I trust the Indians will maintain this policy of not in any way, shape, or form assisting the Iranian government in its nuclear plans, and in giving the right advice to the Iranian government that we would expect any democratic country to give.

And what the Indian nuclear scientists themselves say?

Why Hyde Act of America denies Indian nuclear sovereignty?

Indian Nuclear Scientists and Experts: Aug. 19, 2007

An in depth analysis of
Henry J. Hyde U.S.-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006
by Indian nuclear scientists and experts.

1) Full co-operation in civilian nuclear energy has been denied to India:

a) U.S. unwillingness to co-operate in the areas of spent-fuel reprocessing and uranium enrichment related to the full nuclear fuel cycle.
b) Denial of the nuclear fuel supply assurances and alternate supply arrangements mutually agreed upon earlier.
c) Limits co-operation in the GNEP programme. India will not be permitted to join as a technology developer but as a recipient state.

 

2) India asked to participate in the international effort on nuclear non-proliferation, with a policy congruent to that of United States.

The Hyde Act envisages (Section-109) India to jointly participate with the U.S. in a programme involving the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration to further nuclear non-proliferation goals.
This goes much beyond the IAEA norms and has been unilaterally introduced apparently without the knowledge of the Indian government. In addition, the U.S. President is required to annually report to the congress whether India is fully and actively participating in U.S. and international efforts to dissuade, isolate and if necessary sanction and contain Iran for its pursuit of indigenous efforts to develop nuclear capabilities.
These stipulations in the Act and others pertaining to the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), the Wassenaar Arrangement, and the Australia Group etc. are totally outside the scope of the July 18th Agreement and they constitute intrusion into India’s independent decision making and policy matters. India’s adherence to MTCR is also unnecessarily brought in.

 

3) Impact on our Strategic Defense Programme

In responding to the concerns earlier expressed by us, the Prime Minister stated in the Rajya Sabha on August 17, 2006 “we are fully conscious of the changing complexity of the international political system. Nuclear weapons are an integral part of our national security and will remain so, pending the elimination of all nuclear weapons and universal non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament. Our freedom of action with regard to our strategic programmes remains unrestricted. The nuclear agreement will not be allowed to be used as a backdoor method of introducing NPT type restrictions on India.” And yet, this Act totally negates the above assurance of the PM.

In view of the uncertain strategic situation around the globe, we are of the view that India must not directly or indirectly concede our right to conduct future nuclear weapon tests, if these are found necessary to strengthen our minimum deterrence.

In this regard, the Act makes it explicit that if India conducts such tests, the nuclear cooperation will be terminated and we will be required to return all equipment and materials we might have received under this deal.

To avoid any abrupt stoppage of nuclear fuel for reactors, which we may import, India and the U.S. had mutually agreed to certain alternative fuel supply options, which this Act has totally eliminated out of consideration. Thus, any future nuclear test will automatically result in a heavy economic loss to the country because of the inability to continue the operation of all such imported reactors.

Furthermore, the PM had assured the nation that “India is willing to join any non-discriminatory, multilaterally negotiated and internationally verifiable Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), as and when it is concluded in the Conference on Disarmament.”

But, the Act requires the U.S. to “encourage India to identify and declare a date by which India would be willing to stop production of fissile material for nuclear weapons unilaterally or pursuant to a multilateral moratorium or treaty.”

In his Rajya Sabha address, the PM had said, “Our commitment towards non-discriminatory global nuclear disarmament remains unwavering, in line with the Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan. There is no dilution on this count.”

Unfortunately, the Act is totally silent on the U.S. working with India to move towards universal nuclear disarmament, but it eloquently covers all aspects of non-proliferation controls of U.S. priority, into which they want to draw India into committing.

 

In summary, it is obvious that the Hyde Act still retains many of the objectionable clauses in the earlier House and Senate bills on which the Prime Minister had clearly put forth his objections and clarified the Indian position in both Houses of Parliament.

Once this Act is signed into law, all further bilateral agreements with the U.S. will be required to be consistent with this law.

As such, the Government of India may convey these views formally to the U.S. Administration and they should be reflected in the 123 Agreement.

Signatories:
Dr. A.N.Prasad, former Director, Bhabha Atomic Research Centre
Dr. H.N. Sethna, former Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
Dr. M.R. Srinivasan, former Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
Dr. P.K. Iyengar, former Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
Dr. Placid Rodriguez, former Director, Indira Gandhi Center for Atomic Research
Dr. A. Gopalakrishnan, former Chairman, Atomic Energy Regulatory Board
Dr. Y.S.R. Prasad, former Chairman & Managing Director, Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited

Fellow Indians, do not trust anyone, please read the documents for yourselves, for
if you do not act now, you are as much to blame, when our sovereignty is sold away.

AmericaIndiaHyde’s Act123 Agreementfearmongering

If you can’t get what you want
use exaggerated fear on a constant basis, as a leverage till
you get the opinions and actions of others towards your desired end.
The American’s championed it during the Cold War against the “commies”.

We are suddenly witnessing the same in India,
the “Left” has dared to question the dream charity that America is giving us
and the pro-US Indians, probably with motives purely selfish, are out fear-mongering.

Before our government signs away 40 years of our future, everyone of us
have a right to know what and why, I do not care who asks and for what motives.

These are the queries (as quoted below) that has been raised, by the ridiculed “Left” .
Each of these are legitimate and relevant concerns that every intelligent Indian,
who cares about our country and our sovereign rights, should be now asking.

Let us do away with the hearsay about hearsays and interpretations of biased minds.

N-deal: Left has 9 queries

From Asian Age Archives: By Seema Mustafa : New Delhi, Aug. 6 2007

The nine objections raised by the CPI(M) against the India-US civilian nuclear energy agreement have not been addressed in the 123 agreement.

The Left leaders have been consulting scientists and strategic experts to reach a final position on the 123 agreement at a meeting scheduled to be held here on Tuesday.
Not a single objection raised by the Left has been met, according to strategic experts consulted by this newspaper.

The CPI(M) had issued a statement listing the “explicit departures in the Senate and Congress drafts from the original agreement” signed by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and US President George W. Bush.

1. The CPI(M) was concerned that the deal required India to pursue a foreign policy congruent to that of the US; and to secure India’s full and active participation in US efforts to sanction and contain Iran.

Nothing has changed with the 123 agreement. This codifies technical rules of nuclear commerce. It does not supersede the Hyde Act but is a subsidiary arrangement under the Hyde Act read with the US Atomic Energy Act.

The Hyde Act is clear that Indian foreign policy has to remain congruent with the US, on Iran and all other vital issues.

US undersecretary of state for political affairs Nicholas Burns said as much when asked about Iran by the American media. He said the 123 agreement was a technical document, and that the US expected India to follow its policy on Iran.

He even said that he was hopeful that India would not enter into any long-term gas and energy cooperation with Iran, a reference to the gas pipeline.

Despite the 123 agreement, the US President has to annually certify to Congress that India is in full compliance with the congressionally imposed non-proliferation conditions.

The controversial provision for instituting a “cooperative threat reduction programme” remains.
It has just been re-named by the Hyde Act as “United States-India scientific cooperative nuclear non-proliferation programme”.

2. The deal would not allow full cooperation on civilian nuclear technology, denying India a complete fuel cycle.

India will continued to face an embargo on importing equipment and components related to enrichment, reprocessing and heavy water production, even when such activities are under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections and for peaceful purposes. Article 5(2) in the 123 agreement makes this very clear.

3. Steps to be taken by India would be conditional upon and contingent on action taken by the US.

It is clear from the 123 agreement itself that all restrictions are not being lifted. Embargoes are still in place, and the US President is still required to annually certify to the Congress that India is in “full compliance” with the congressionally imposed non-proliferation conditions.

4. The US will not take the necessary steps to change its laws or align the NSG rules to fulfil the terms of the India-US nuclear deal.

The 123 agreement does not change the requirement of the Hyde Act that the NSG exemption for India be “made by consensus” and be consistent with the rules being framed by the US. The legislation requires the administration to ensure that the NSG exemption for India is no less stringent than the US exemption.

5. The additional protocol referred to in the original agreement would be intrusive and not India-specific.

New Delhi’s agreement with the IAEA will be “India-specific” only in name and would contain only a cosmetic reference to India’s right to take undefined and unenforceable “corrective measures” in all other respects.

The 123 agreement, in its “definitions”, defines well understood terms but not corrective measures. The Hyde Act prescribes for India the highly invasive Model Additional Protocol applicable to non-nuclear weapons states.

One prerequisite to bring the deal into force is that India and the IAEA should have “concluded all legal steps required prior to signature” to enforce inspections “in perpetuity”.

A second prerequisite mentioned in the 123 agreement is for India to make “substantial progress” on concluding an additional protocol with the IAEA.

The Hyde Act defines additional protocol as the one set for non-nuclear states in the 1997 IAEA information circular.

At the press conference announcing the 123 agreement, national security adviser M.K. Narayanan and the Atomic Energy Commission chairman, Dr Anil Kakodkar, did not answer a question on the additional protocol, saying that this would be taken up later.

6. India is placing its facilities in perpetuity while the US President can prevent the transfer to India of equipment, materials or technology from other participating governments in the NSG, or from any other source.

The 123 agreement offers assured fuel supply only so long as India adheres to the US-prescribed non-proliferation conditions.

The assurances of uninterrupted fuel supply cover only disruption due to market failure, or technical, or logistical, difficulties, but not sanctions arising from India’s non-compliance with non-proliferation conditions.

Both the 123 agreement and the Hyde Act have explicitly stopped New Delhi from lifting safeguards even if the US were to deliberately terminate all supplies.

7. India’s fissile material stockpile will be restricted.

The 123 agreement has not changed this.

The Hyde Act lays emphasis on getting India to cease all fissile material production even before negotiations on an FMCT have begun in Geneva.

The act requires the US President to periodically inform Congress about “steps that the US has taken and will take to encourage India to identify and declare a date by which India would be willing to stop production of fissile material for nuclear weapons unilaterally or pursuant to a multilateral moratorium or treaty”.

8. The deal includes physical verification and suitable access to be provided by India to US inspectors, and not just IAEA safeguards.

US end-use monitoring is reflected in the 123 agreement’s Article 12 (3).

Also, the provision for US fallback safeguards in Article 10 (4) states, “If the IAEA decides that the application of IAEA safeguards is no longer possible, the supplier and recipient should consult and agree on appropriate verification measures.”

9. The military programme will also be subject to monitoring by the IAEA and the US.

The 123 agreement does not change that requirement in the Hyde Act.

The Hyde Act stipulates, “The President shall keep the appropriate congressional committees fully and currently informed of the fact and implications of any significant nuclear activities of India”, which includes the fissile material produced and the production of nuclear weapons by India.

It also demands annual estimates from the administration about the amount of uranium mined and milled in India, the amount of uranium used or allocated for the production of nuclear explosive devices, and the rate of production in India of both fissile material and nuclear explosive devices.

The legislation seeks to cap, roll back and eliminate India’s nuclear deterrent with the phrase “halt the increase of nuclear weapons arsenals in South Asia, and to promote their reduction and eventual elimination”.

And those of you, who wants us to believe US will protect us from the Chinese, dream on.

AmericaIndiaHyde’s Act123 Agreementfearmongering

It is true that India now suffers and will in future face a huge energy gap.
But it is NOT TRUE that India does not have the resources
to meet our evergrowing energy requirement.

We not only have enough resources for solar and wind generated power stations,
we also have nuclear.
We are the world’s third largest reserve of Thorium.

We have it in abundance in the coastal sands of Orissa and Kerala.
It is believed we have 290 000 tonnes of economically extractable Thorium.

Thorium

Perspectives of the Thorium Fuel Cycle

Why Thorium?
Thorium is much more abundant in nature than uranium.
U-233 bred from thorium is the best of the 3 nuclear fuels, U-235, Pu-239, U-233
It is more eco friendly producing less of long-lived radioactive waste.
Thorium and its compounds are very stable. Its oxide melts around 3300°C.
This stability allows high burn-ups and high temperatures; less chances of accidents.

Why not Thorium?
Thorium needs a “match” to kickstart, that can only be U-235 or plutonium.
[It is an advantage as is an excellent way to use up the excess plutonium stocks]

Reprocessing is an integral part of a sustainable thorium fuel cycle.
Presence of hard gamma emitters makes the manufacture U-233 based fuels in remote gamma-shielded environment mandatory, a very expensive technique.

With our huge Thorium reserves, our scientists haven’t been just sitting around,
they have made utilisation of thorium for large-scale energy production our major goal.

THE THREE-STAGE INDIAN NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAMME

Quoted from Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India document:
“Shaping the Third Stage of Indian Nuclear Power Programme”

The importance of nuclear energy, as a sustainable energy resource for our country, was recognised at the very inception of our atomic energy programme more than four decades ago. A three-stage nuclear power programme, based on a closed nuclear fuel cycle, was then chalked out.

The three stages are:
   1. Natural uranium fuelled Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors (PHWRs),
   2. Fast Breeder Reactors (FBRs) utilising plutonium based fuel, and,
   3. Advanced nuclear power systems for utilisation of thorium.

For carrying out an efficient production of plutonium, the fissile material needed to fuel further growth in nuclear power capacity, a natural uranium fuelled heavy water moderated reactor is the best option.

In the First Stage: we started the indigenous development of nuclear power plants based on uranium cycle in PHWRs. At present we have twelve such reactors under operation, four are under construction, and several others have been planned. We have become self sufficient in all aspects of the PHWR technology. The capacity factors of our operating PHWRs have been close to eighty percent during recent years, an excellent performance even with respect to international standards.

As a part of the Second Stage, we started the FBR programme with the Fast Breeder Test Reactor (FBTR), at IGCAR, Kalpakkam. This reactor, operating with indigenously developed mixed (U+Pu) carbide fuel, has already yielded a large volume of operating experience and a better understanding of the technologies involved. This has enabled us to design 500 MWe (prototype) FBR that will utilise plutonium and the depleted uranium from our PHWRs. Construction of this reactor is due to begin soon.

In preparation for the Third Stage, development of technologies pertaining to utilisation of thorium have been a part of our ongoing activities. Considerable thorium irradiation experience has been acquired in research reactors and we have introduced thorium in PHWRs in a limited way. With our sustained efforts over the past many years, we already have small-scale experience over the entire thorium fuel cycle.

An example is the KAMINI reactor, in IGCAR, the only currently operating reactor in the world, which uses 233U as fuel. This fuel was bred, processed and fabricated indigenously. Efforts are currently on to enlarge that experience to a bigger scale. We are now designing and developing advanced nuclear systems, which will utilise our precious plutonium resources in an optimum way to maximise conversion of thorium to 233U, extract power in-situ from the thorium fuel, and recycle the bred 233U in future reactors.

In India, both Kakrapar-1 and -2 units are loaded with 500 kg of thorium fuel in order to improve their operation when newly-started. Kakrapar-1 was the first reactor in the world to use thorium, rather than depleted uranium, to achieve power flattening across the reactor core.

In 1995, Kakrapar-1 achieved about 300 days of full power operation and Kakrapar-2 about 100 days utilising thorium fuel. The use of thorium-based fuel is planned in Kaiga-1 and -2 and Rajasthan-3 and -4 (Rawatbhata) reactors.

A paper was submitted by Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) to the International Conference on Emerging Nuclear Energy Systems (ICENES) held June 9-14 in Istanbul this year.

The BARC scientist have claimed that once the world’s uranium runs out, thorium – and the depleted uranium discharged by today’s power reactors – could form the ‘fertile base’ for nuclear power generation. And they are in the process of developing a Fast Thorium Breeder Reactor (FTBR) at the BARC in Mumbai.

They believe their FTBR is a ‘candidate’ reactor that can produce energy from these two fertile materials with some help from fissile plutonium as a ‘seed’ to start the fire. By using a mix of ‘seed’ plutonium and fertile zones inside the core, the scientists show theoretically that their design can breed not one but two nuclear fuels – U-233 from thorium and plutonium from depleted uranium – within the same reactor.

This totally new concept of fertile-to-fissile conversion has prompted them to call it the Fast ‘Twin’ Breeder Reactor. Their calculations show the sodium-cooled FTBR, while consuming 10.96 tonnes of plutonium to generate 1,000 MW of power, breeds 11.44 tonnes of plutonium and 0.88 tonnes of U-233 in a cycle length of two years.

BARC’s FTBR is claimed to be the first design that truly exploits the concept of ‘breeding’ in a reactor that uses thorium. The handful of fast breeder reactors (FBRs) in the world today – including the one India is building in Kalpakkam near Chennai – use plutonium as fuel. These breeders have to wait until enough plutonium is accumulated through reprocessing of spent fuel discharged by thermal power reactors that run on uranium.

The BARC scientists say that thorium should be inducted into power reactors when the uranium is still available, rather than after it is exhausted. The FTBR only needs an initial inventory of plutonium to kick-start the thorium cycle and eventually to generate electricity.

A blanket ban on India re-processing imported uranium – a condition for nuclear cooperation with the US – could make India’s thorium programme a non-starter.

Former BARC director P.K. Iyengar has one suggestion that he says must be acceptable to the US if it is serious about helping India to solve its energy problem. ‘The US and Russia have piles of plutonium from dismantled nuclear weapons,’ Iyengar said, adding: ‘They should allow us to borrow this plutonium needed to start our breeders.We can return the material after we breed enough.’

The Hyde Act and the 123 Agreement with its strict restriction on reprocessing the purchased fuel binds us in a deal to be a purchaser of Uranium and its processing technology.

Instead of breaking free from the NSG cartel, we become chained to it for 40 years.

We have are own N-fuel, we do not need Uranium, we need enriched Plutonium to finish our three stage Nuclear Programme and be energy independant for ever.

This Indo-US nuclear deal will KILL off OUR 50 YEARS of reasearch and hard work.

It is not us who will suffer, we will be dead and gone, it will be our future generations. It is now time for all us Indians to ask questions, and to find the truth for ourselves.

AmericaIndiaHyde’s Act123 AgreementThorium

Many self-professed experts are advising us, ordinary Indians, of our benefits from the:

United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006 the “Hyde Act”
Agreement for cooperation between United States and India, the “123 Agreement”

Anyone who questions these are frowned upon and aligned with the “communist left”.
And we are advised to learn the “realism” of international affairs.

But what do our nuclear scientists themselves think of the new deal, those who have struggled against the sanctions since 1974 to bring us to where we stand today?

Who else is better to set us the benchmark for India’s future
not only as a nuclear power but also in our vision
of Universal Nuclear Disarmament?

THIS IS the text of an appeal issued by nine leading nuclear scientists just over an year ago on 15.08.2006.
I have quoted it just as I have found it.

Appeal to parliamentarians on nuclear deal

Senior nuclear scientists urge MPs to ensure that decisions taken today do not inhibit India’s future ability to develop and pursue nuclear technologies for the benefit of the nation.

“While the nation and Parliament discuss the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal from various angles, we feel it is our responsibility to place before the nation our well-considered views on the impact of this deal on the future of Indian nuclear science and technology, and its effects on the energy security of the nation. We have all worked in the field of atomic energy from the very early years after India’s independence. From very small beginnings, we have now reached a stage where we are in possession of all the technologies needed for the production of electricity from indigenous nuclear minerals, and have successfully applied these technologies in diverse sectors from health, agriculture and industry to national and energy security. All this has been possible with the support of the people represented in the government through Parliament, and the outstanding statesmen who have guided and supported our plans.

We therefore feel it is our obligation to make public our perceptions for the effective and continued nurturing and utilisation of this technology in the country.

Science is universal. Knowledge can be created in any part of the world, and technology comes with experimentation and the willingness to take risks. We have followed all these paths to reach the present stage of development. We are amongst the most advanced countries in the technology of fast-breeder reactors, which is crucial to the future of our energy security. Along the way we have derived benefits from international collaboration. At the same time, we have also shared some of our abilities in this field with the world. Indian scientists have been ambassadors, with knowledge and creativity as their tools. It is of prime importance to uphold these cherished traditions.

It is significant that the most advanced country in nuclear science and technology has come forward to accept us into the international nuclear community, by the historic document signed by our Prime Minister with President Bush on 18th July, 2005. The basic principles for cooperation were well laid out in this bilateral understanding and the Prime Minister has apprised our Parliament of this. No doubt it needs the concurrence of the other nations comprising the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Based on this agreement, the U.S. lawmakers and the administration are in the process of re-framing their laws, which could change the nature of relations between the two countries. This is a most welcome initiative of the UPA government, and is a continuation of the process essentially begun during the previous NDA government. Thus, there is no question of any political partisanship on this matter.

However, the lawmakers of the U.S. Congress have modified, both in letter and spirit, the implementation of such an agreement. At this juncture, among other aspects, it is essential that we insist on the following four central themes:

1. India should continue to be able to hold on to her nuclear option as a strategic requirement in the real world that we live in, and in the ever-changing complexity of the international political system. This means that we cannot accede to any restraint in perpetuity on our freedom of action. We have not done this for the last forty years after the Non-Proliferation Treaty came into being, and there is no reason why we should succumb to this now. Universal nuclear disarmament must be our ultimate aim, and until we see the light at the end of the tunnel on this important issue, we cannot accept any agreement in perpetuity.

KAMINI: the first reactor in the world, designed specifically to use uranium-233 (from Thorium) fuel.

2. After 1974, when the major powers discontinued cooperation with us, we have built up our capability in many sensitive technological areas, which need not and should not now be subjected to external control. Safeguards are understandable where external assistance for nuclear materials or technologies are involved. We have agreed to this before, and we can continue to agree to this in the future too, but strictly restricted to those facilities and materials imported from external sources.

3. We find that the Indo-U.S. deal, in the form approved by the U.S. House of Representatives, infringes on our independence for carrying out indigenous research and development (R&D) in nuclear science and technology. Our R&D should not be hampered by external supervision or control, or by the need to satisfy any international body. Research and technology development are the sovereign rights of any nation. This is especially true when they concern strategic national defence and energy self-sufficiency.

4. While the sequence of actions to implement the cooperation could be left for discussion between the two governments, the basic principles on which such actions will rest is the right of Parliament and the people to decide. The Prime Minister has already taken up with President Bush the issue of the new clauses recommended by the U.S. House of Representatives. If the U.S. Congress, in its wisdom, passes the bill in its present form, the `product’ will become unacceptable to India, and, diplomatically, it will be very difficult to change it later. Hence it is important for our Parliament to work out, and insist on, the ground rules for the nuclear deal, at this stage itself.

We therefore request you, the Parliamentarians, to discuss this deal and arrive at a unanimous decision, recognising the fundamental facts of India’s indigenous nuclear science and technology achievements to date, the efforts made to overcome the unfair restrictions placed on us and the imaginative policies and planning enunciated and followed in the years after Independence. The nation, at this critical juncture, depends on its representatives in Parliament to ensure that decisions taken today do not inhibit our future ability to develop and pursue nuclear technologies for the benefit of the nation”.

The statement issued on Monday has been signed by:

1. Dr. H.N. Sethna, former Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission;
2. Dr. M.R. Srinivasan, former Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission;
3. Dr. P.K. Iyengar, former Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission;
4. Dr. A. Gopalakrishnan, former Chairman, Atomic Energy Regulatory Board;
5. Dr. S.L. Kati, former Managing Director, Nuclear Power Corporation;
6. Dr. A.N. Prasad, former Director, Bhabha Atomic Research Centre;
7. Dr. Y.S.R. Prasad, former Chairman & Managing Director, Nuclear Power Corporation;
8. Dr. Placid Rodriguez, former Director, Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research.

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